The Decline of Europe
The leading states of the
European Union, and in particular of the eurozone, are dogged by a growing
sense of decline. But this is still a confused awareness, as demonstrated by
the fact that it is the individual states, their production systems and their societies
that are said to be in decline, rather than Europe as a whole, and also by the
fact that no one appreciates the historical as opposed to cyclical-economic
nature of Europeís decline, or understands the causes that prompted it
in the first place and that are ensuring its continued deepening. But Europe is in decline, and there is
a vague realisation of this fact. The quality of civil cohabitation in Europe
is being damaged by lack of confidence. The future is perceived as dark and
uncertain. The spirit of innovation and of enterprise and the will to plan are
frustrated at every turn.
* * *
This decline concerns,
first of all, international politics, and its effects have emerged with stark
clarity in the events surrounding the Balkan crisis and, more recently, the war
in Iraq. In this latter case, the Europeans have been obliged not only to
watch, helpless, the unfolding of a senseless war that they did not even want,
but also to sustain a considerable share of the enormous costs it has generated
and continues to generate.
That Europe no longer
carries any weight on the international political stage, and is subject to the
hegemony of the United States, is hardly a new discovery. It is a reality that
became clear at the end of the Second World War, even though the phenomenon was
subsequently ó during the Cold War ó concealed by the threat that
the presence of the Soviet Union represented to both the US and Europe. The
fact that the United Statesí hegemony had a clear rival in the USSR
prevented the Europeans from feeling dominated, and gave them the sensation
that they were contributing to the realisation of a joint project and to the
defence of common values.
This is no longer the case
today. Now, the danger lies not in the risk of a possible attack from outside,
but in terrorism fed by Islamic fun-damentalism, whose network extends to the
United States and all the countries of Europe. And American hegemony certainly
does nothing to guarantee European security in the face of this danger. It is a
fact that Europe could play a decisive role in the attempt to eradicate evil at
grass roots level, favouring unity, economic development and the democratic
evolution of the states of North West Africa and the Middle East, with which it
enjoys a positive relationship characterised by geographical proximity and
close interdependence. But its impotence prevents it from playing an effective
role in this area, or in any other sensitive world region. As a result,
Europeans are finding, more and more often, that they serve merely to make up
the numbers in the international equilibrium. Whereas new actors, like China,
India and Brazil, are entering the world political stage, and old actors, like
Russia, are making a comeback, Europe is exiting the scene and counting for less
and less in the strategic calculations both of the only major power that
currently exists and of those that are emerging.
The European governments
are perfectly aware of Europeís rapid international slide, just as they
are aware of the need for European foreign and defence policies. But they
believe, or more accurately, they feign to believe, that this problem can be
resolved by strengthening collaboration between the Unionís member
states (or between some of them), through the formation of small multinational
task forces or the achievement of a degree of coordination of arms production;
and possibly by creating figures who, despite being entirely devoid of the
power to make and implement decisions in Europeís name, can represent
the Union formally and allow it to ìspeak with a single voice.î
Clearly, this is not the way to halt Europeís international decline.
* * *
Equally shocking is
economic decline of the leading eurozone countries, which are recording, in
relation to their GDP, extremely weak, and sometimes even negative growth.
Their unemployment levels are sky high and their production systems are
becoming less and less able to fend off the growing competition from eastern Asia.
The euro, despite its apparent strength, has failed to take off as an
international currency, and continues to be conditioned by the trend of the
dollar; at the same time, depreciation of the dollar is cancelling out the
balance of payments surplus of the countries belonging to economic and monetary
union, but in the absence of any compensatory growth of these countriesí
domestic markets. There exists no European policy to relaunch public spending
ó in spite of the fact that a growing number of countries have exceeded
or look set to exceed the budget deficit limit imposed by the Stability Pact
ó and no infrastructure development policy. The number of production
sectors in real difficulty is multiplying, as is the number of financial
crises.
Politicians and observers
alike cannot help but note this trend. But they fail to appreciate the true
nature of it. This much is clear from the fake remedies that are proposed, the
first of which consists of overcoming the so-called rigidity of the labour
market and dismantling, at least in part, the welfare state, which was built on
the social achievements that have made Europe the world region that has
accomplished most in the fight for social justice and better civil
cohabitation. And all this in the name of a sort of social Darwinism whose
logic is that of enriching the rich while condemning a considerable section of
the population to an existence of insecurity, marginalisation and poverty. The
second is to push the European Central Bank into lowering further the already
extremely low base interest rate, a measure that would create practically no
extra room for manoeuvre, thereby failing to learn from the example of Japan,
which, despite having almost zero interest rates, has nevertheless endured an
extremely protracted period of stagnation.
In reality the causes of
Europeís economic decline lie in the incapacity to act that is a
consequence of its division. They are political and in-stitutional, that is to
say, structural causes, not ones linked to economic trends. This is not to deny
that the current downward trend will go through cyclical phases. But it will
not be reversed until Europeís political weakness has been overcome. It
is this political weakness that prevents the euro from taking its place alongside
the dollar as an international currency, discourages the labelling of
contracts, particularly oil supply contracts, in euros, and reduces
international investorsí faith in the European currency. In this way the
euro, and with it the whole of the eurozoneís foreign trade, submits
passively to the consequences of the fortunes of the dollar, which appreciates
or depreciates according to the policy of the US government.
The truth is that the
European Monetary Union is not backed by a European power, with a sphere of
influence that is dependent on Europe for its security and development, into
which Europe can channel resources, and with which it can intensify trade,
adopting the euro as an international currency.
Obviously, the urgent need
for a European power with the capacity to act is dictated by more than just
this need to strengthen the international role of the euro; it is also linked
to the question of internal control of the currency.
As things stand at the
moment, the single currency has been left in the hands of a technical body,
whose only role is to keep inflation in check. This body urgently needs to be
joined by a political body that, governing the real economy and promoting its
growth, is in a position to influence the value of the currency. This body must
have its own budget, funded by direct taxation of the citizens, the size of
which will depend not on difficult agreements between countries whose sole
concern is to contribute as little as possible to the Union, but instead be
decided democratically at European level. It must be equipped to counter
negative economic trends with a policy that is effective, and not strangled by
the obligation (in reality, often not fulfilled) to adhere to the parameters of
a Stability Pact imposed as a result of the absurd co-existence of a single
currency and a number of sovereign states, each with responsibility for its own
economic policy. It must have at its disposal the instruments needed to develop
and put into practice a great infrastructural design capable of relaunching the
European economy.
* * *
The economic decline of
the eurozone is paralleled by its technological inferiority to the United
States, especially marked in the sectors of information networks, space
exploration and the biotechnologies, and increasingly to China, which has
recently approved an ambitious space programme. It must be underlined that the
degree of technological progress recorded by Europe, the United States and
China, shows, in all three cases, absolutely no relationship with the size of
the respective countryís GDP. This is because great technological
progress can be achieved only if it is actively promoted by the public powers,
and adopted and developed by industry only when it has reached a level at which
it allows the production of goods and services for which there is a potential
market. This is what happened not only in the obvious case of the space
programmes, but also in that of the Internet, which started out as a military
project, and in that of the biotechnologies, which have evolved thanks to
public funding of research conducted in the laboratories of universities,
research centres and hospitals. Technology is thus able to evolve when the
resources of a large, developed (or developing) market are coordinated and
employed by an applied research policy conceived to support a design capable of
mobilising the resources of an entire country.
It cannot evolve in Europe
ó with the exception of the odd success in the field of space research
ó because in the technological sphere, as in many others, the European
countries have separate, intersecting and overlapping policies, whose funding
is wholly inadequate. In truth, the European Union is a bureaucratic and not a
political entity, and no one of its member states, being weak and impotent, is
able to recruit the energies needed to support a great project for the future.
This situation naturally
has repercussions on the sphere of basic research, which represents the
necessary foundation of technology. There is no point dwelling upon the
lamentable state of scientific research in Europe, which is widely known and
demonstrated by the mass exodus of young researchers to the United States. All
we will say is that Europe, which still has a valid secondary school and
university system, pours money
into the education of young scientists, only to lose them to the United States,
whose secondary schools and universities, with the odd exception, are of a far
lower standard. The United States is thus able to profit from the work of
foreign-trained scientific personnel from the very moment these individuals,
having represented a cost for the states in which they were schooled, become
productive.
* * *
In fact, the technological
and scientific decline of the eurozone is nothing more than the most obvious
manifestation of the process that is turning its countries into a cultural
wasteland. It is true that cultural decline in its broadest sense is something
that is hard to establish, given that quantitative analysis of it is difficult
and qualitative description inevitably subjective. There can also be no doubt
that continental Europe has great traditions, deeply rooted in its history and
cultural institutions, which enjoy notable prestige, acquired over decades and
sometimes centuries, and which puts a brake on this inexorable decline. But it is
also a fact that the arts, architecture, literature, the theatre, music,
history, philosophy, and the social sciences follow the migration of power and
wealth, and that they have now abandoned Europe in favour of the United States
(a phenomenon less marked in the UK, thanks to Britain and America enjoying a
ìspecial relationshipî and sharing the same language). It is a
fact, too, that the leading cultural institutions in the United States are
enjoying a boom ó not only are they increasing in number, they are also
becoming more wealthy and more active ó , whereas the opposite is
happening in Europe. On the other side of the Atlantic, there exists a wealthy
public and a vast publishing market that together stimu-late the creation of
culture and feed cultural debate. Americaís leading cities, New York in
particular, have the irresistible attraction of being the most important stages
of what is the last remaining great global power, and are thus the focus of the
aspirations of all those seeking success and renown through the production of
culture. As all this is going on, Europe is becoming increasingly impoverished
and moving slowly towards its own curtain-fall.
* * *
At this point, one can
hardly be surprised that a mood of demoralisation, due to the lack of future
prospects, is creeping over the citizens of Europe, that the most talented of
Europeís youth is forced either to leave or to downsize its ambitions in
accordance with the widespread medi-ocrity that prevails within the continent,
or that there lack collective projects with the potential to stimulate as yet
unexpressed skills and resources and to mobilise energies. Neither can one be
surprised that this attitude generates a deep lack of faith in a political
order that is unable to halt Europeís downward slide and incapable of
involving the citizens in a great design that represents an important step
forward towards the liberation of mankind.
All this is the
progressive decline of politics, politics being a term that, in Europe, now has
nothing to do with the idea of the pursuit of the com-mon good. Of its dual
nature, based on ethos and kratos, all that remains is the power struggle aspect. And
this, stripped of the values that ennoble it, appears merely repulsive.
Politics is no longer about things that need to be done and objectives that
must be pursued; instead it is degenerating into a sort of squalid theatre in
which a political class without ideas is interested only in its own self
promotion in the media. European politics today is preoccupied solely with
image and with squabbling, putting on a spectacle for the benefit of a passive
public that is incapable of reacting.
Civil society, in an
advanced industrial state, is without doubt made up of men and women who are
concerned, above all, with their own private affairs and their own welfare. But
when the political climate heats up, and the issues are important, the citizens
show themselves to be sensitive to the appeals and entreaties issued by the
political class and by the most lively and active sections of society, and
ready to be drawn into political debate. This is true not only when, like at
election times, they are instruments in the struggle for power, but also in
relation to the vicissitudes of everyday politics. The opposite occurs when politics
is unable to come up with ideas or develop projects. In this situation, any
willingness of the citizens to engage in political debate is repressed, or
degenerates into sterile protest that is devoid of new ideas, or, at best, is
channelled into non political voluntary work. When this happens, there is no
point directing rhetoric at the citizens, and appealing to them to have
confidence, unless you also show them a vision of a better future and the path
that must be followed in order to attain it. Confidence cannot be built by
delivering proclamations and vague incitements, but only by proposing a precise
plan that, based on clear ideals, has real value and is thus likely to induce a
great many people to become committed to its realisation.
* * *
It is therefore up to
politics to reverse the trend, showing the citizens a clear and concrete
objective that, once more taking the great values of European civilisation as
the ultimate point of reference for political debate, gives meaning to the
lives of all, and instils a sense of hope in the young. And given that
Europeís division is at the root of its decline, then this objective can
only be the unification of the continent. Indeed, there can be no denying that
the waning of public spirit in the European states has, quite clearly, gone
hand in hand with the weakening of the ideal of European unification.
In order to render
concrete and visible this project for our continent, European unification must
not be allowed to remain an ambiguous and general term; instead, it must be
synonymous with a clearly defined point of destination. Europe can regain a
role on the international stage, give its currency a role comparable with that
of the dollar, and give its citizens the feeling that they are contributing to
the decisions determining the evolution of the process of the liberation of
mankind, but only by becoming a leading actor in world affairs, by conducting a
foreign policy that serves the values of peace, collaboration and development,
and by rendering this policy credible through its control of an army that is
answerable to a democratic power. It can inject new life into its economy, but
only if it has its own budget and the power to fund this budget through
taxation, rather than depending on the goodwill of the Unionís member
states. In this way, it will be able to develop and carry through a great plan
for internal and international economic development and an ambitious policy for
technological advancement, which will render its production system once more
competitive and foster a spirit of enterprise, without jeopardising the great
achievements of the welfare state. In this way, it will regain the stimuli and
the resources needed to get back to the cutting edge of scientific research and
to become, once again, the worldís leading centre of artistic creation
and cultural debate.
But to give a European
government exclusive control of an army, that is, a monopoly on physical force,
and to enable it to have at its disposal a budget of its own and the power of taxation,
in other words, to give Europe the instruments of the sword and the purse, means to attribute it
with sovereign powers. In short, to establish, in Europe, a federal state, beginning within the
limited sphere in which this project is truly feasible, and ending with a great
entity that embraces the territory of the entire European Union, whatever its
configuration. Today, in Europe, the state exists only in the historically
superseded national framework, that is, in a dimension that does not allow the
development of great projects or the taking of great decisions, and that thus
belittles the aspirations of its citizens and saps their energy; meanwhile, the
dimension in which all this would be possible is filled with bureaucratic
institutions, whose decisions, whenever they are arrived at, are expressions of
slow and laborious compromises reached between the governments of numerous
(formerly fifteen, now twenty-five) sovereign states, and not the result of
democratic debate among the citizens of Europe and the parties that represent
them.
The founding of a federal
state in Europe is an enormously difficult objective. Like all the historical
objectives that have required a radical transformation of the power order, it
may even seem impossible. What is beyond doubt is that it cannot be achieved
through technical fudging of the issues, which serves only to mask the reality,
that is the nation-statesí continued preservation of their sovereignty.
In truth, no alliance, no
confederation or customs union, no complex institutional construct ó
even one that goes by the name of constitution ó can get round the fact
that sovereignty is either left in the hands of the nation-states or
transferred to Europe: and that this transfer can come about only if Europe becomes
a state,
even one based initially on a re-stricted group of countries set within a
geographically expanding framework.
This is the only course
that will not only enable Europe to face up to the great problems of
international collaboration, security and economic growth, but also make
politics once more synonymous with commitment to the common good, and thus the
most noble of human activities. Only a state with a decisive role in the global
equilibrium can devise and pursue a great design ó internal or international
ó that gives citizenship the value of being involved in the promoting of
peace and the building of an open, innovative and solid society, and by so
doing gather consensus and mobilise energies.
This is why, today, the
difficult battle to found a European federal state is the only one worth
fighting.
The Federalist